Abstract. We empirically examine the Biased Expectations Hypothesis, which states that recent price movements in certain sectors play special roles in the formation of individuals inflation expectations. Specifically we analyze whether economists rationally bias their expectations and whether economists and consumers naively bias their expectations with respect to recent inflation in the food and energy sectors. We develop theoretical models for both rationally formed and naively formed inflation expectations. We find that economists do not bias their rationally formed expectations and that consumers and economists do not naively form inflation expectations. Our results do not support the Biased Expectations Hypothesis; rather, they reinforce the use of core measures of inflation in policy making.
Introduction
Inflation expectations are used by households and firms in decisions concerning saving, spending, investing, and long-term labor and financial contracts. Through these various decisions inflation expectations help determine actual inflation by a↵ecting aggregate demand and price-setting behavior in labor and financial markets. Accordingly, a central banks ability to achieve price stability depends on the proper understanding of such expectations and their implications. Central banks track survey measures of inflation expectations for comparison with internal forecasts of inflation and with long run inflation targets. As such, understanding the ways in which inflation expectations are formed is crucial in the implementation of monetary policy.
Factors influencing the formation of inflation expectations include, among other things, the way in which monetary authorities conduct policy, how well that policy is Date: May 16, 2013. communicated to the public, and the recent history of price movements. A common view among some policymakers concerning how inflation expectations are formed is that households place extra emphasis on recent price movements in certain highly visible sectors. The view is called the Biased Expectation Hypothesis (BEH). This hypothesis states that recent movements in certain sectoral prices play a special role in the formation of consumers inflation expectations. Put another way with respect to the food sector, "the BEH says that economic agents, when forming expectations about future inflation, place relatively more weight on recent behavior of food prices than expenditure shares indicate." 1 Analyzing whether observed inflation expectations are determined in this way is an important issue for monetary policymakers.
There are at least two ways of understanding this over emphasis of inflation in certain sectors. The first is a simplistic view of the BEH. Consider the frequency with which individuals purchase di↵erent goods. The goods that an individual purchases more often might weigh more heavily in the individuals assessment of the movement of overall prices recently, as the individual readily recognizes changes in the prices of these goods. Therefore, price movements in the sectors producing these goods might disproportionately influence the formation of the individuals expectations for overall inflation. Food and energy are natural choices for sectors that fit this description of highly visible goods prices.
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The second, more sophisticated, interpretation of the BEH has its roots in Van Duynes 1982 paper: Food Prices, Expectations, and Inflation. He shows how a disproportionate influence of price movements in certain sectors can be consistent with rationality. Specifically, he develops a simple macroeconomic model in which it is rational to place weights on sectoral inflation rates that di↵er from the sectors shares in 1 Van Duyne, 1982, p. 419 2 Another determinant of the di↵ering frequency with which an individual assesses prices of di↵erent goods could be di↵erences in information costs related to learning about prices in di↵erent sectors. However, given that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and its components are readily available to the public, cost di↵erentials for price information across sectors seems unlikely to be very large.
consumer expenditure. The notion of rational expectations used is that from John Muths 1961 paper, Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, which posits that price expectations are essentially the same as the predictions of relevant economic theory. Rational bias, in the context of Van Duynes model and the rest of this paper, is defined as the use of weights for sectoral inflation other than those reflecting consumer expenditure shares, when forming inflation expectations rationally; this notion will also be referred to as rational weighting.
Van Duyne develops a two-sector model of the economy in which the processes for determination of food supply shocks are serially correlated. Serial correlation means past shocks help to predict future shocks. Stated di↵erently, serial correlation, resulting from distributed lags in the adjustments of food prices to changes in raw commodity prices, allows for individuals to gain understanding of the future of food price shocks.Therefore, in forming expectations, it is rational for such individuals to place more weight on the movement of prices in the food sector, as past movements of prices in this sector predict actual current inflation, while price movements in other sectors are not predictive in this way. Given that the model holds overall inflation equal to inflation in the manufacturing sector plus temporary disturbances to the rate of inflation in the food sector, serial correlation of food price shocks emphasizes the role that changes in inflation in this sector plays in what can be expected for headline inflation. Thus, it is rational for economic agents to put more weight on past inflation in the food sector when forming expectations about current headline inflation. Van Duynes theoretical model produces an equation for inflation expectations with weights for sectoral inflation di↵erent from the sectors respective shares in consumer expenditure. Since sectoral shares in consumer expenditure are the weights used to calculate the CPI, the weights in the model would be biased away from those that are used in calculating actual inflation.
Using the conclusions of this theoretical framework, Van Duyne employs regression analysis to evaluate the BEH for food price movements during the period from 1966 through 1977. Here, he addresses whether consumers actually bias their inflation expectations. He looks specifically at expectations for inflation from the University of Michigans survey of consumer expectations. His empirical findings indicate that consumers do not bias their expectations for inflation in the basket of goods used to calculate the CPI away from the expenditure shares of the sectors. Van Duyne was unable to reject the hypothesis that consumers use weights for food price movements that are the same as food sectors share in expenditure.
Other authors have studied the relationship between inflation, expectations, and the movement of prices in particular sectors or of certain commodities. In a recent working paper, Celasun, Mihet, and Ratnovski (2012) , look at the e↵ects of commodity price movements, specifically oil prices, on both market-based and survey-based measures of inflation expectations. The market-based measure is implied by the di↵erence between regular Treasury note and bond yields and Treasury Inflation-Protected Security (TIPS) yields. The survey-based measure was, again, the University of Michigans survey of consumer inflation expectations. The authors found that oil and food price movements had statistically significant impact on short-term TIPS-based inflation expectations; they also found that oil prices had an economically significant impact. The conclusion that sectoral price movements do drive inflation expectations is an important start toward understanding how inflation expectations are determined and their role in the determination of actual inflation; however, the paper does not consider whether the weights placed on such price movements are di↵erent from their respective expenditure shares. This additional subtlety is vital for monetary authorities to make responsible policy decisions when interpreting price movements and the importance they give to price movements across di↵erent sectors. Specifically, the fact that policy makers now tend to focus on core inflation measures over headline measures could be a mistake, if the highly variable movements in food and energy prices play emphasized roles in the determination of inflation expectations that then help determine future actual inflation.
Research Questions and Analytical Approach
The analysis we conduct in this paper is twofold. We look at the more sophisticated manifestation of the BEH that uses the serial correlation of price shocks within a generalization of Van Duyne 0 s algebraic framework, and we investigate directly whether the weights, used by consumers, to determine inflation expectations di↵er from the sectoral shares in consumer expenditure, over the period from 1983 to 2012.
As data about consumer expectations for inflation that satisfies the needs of our theoretical framework, which we develop in the following sections, (i.e. inflation expectations data for two periods in the future) is unavailable from the University of Michigan survey of consumers, we substitute for the data collected by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank about the multi period inflation expectations of professional economists. We recognize that it is likely that the expectations of professional economists are more Muth rational than those of consumers, as understanding economic theory is their profession.
However, it is reasonable to think that consumers are not ignorant of basic economic thinking and that their expectations for inflation would not be drastically di↵erent than those of the economists, when presented with price movements. In particular, the vital assumption of serial correlation of price shocks to the food and energy sectors, in the theory to be developed, is fairly intuitive and could be reasonably assumed to factor into consumers 0 formation of inflation expectations.
First we determine if rationally formed inflation expectations of economists are biased (taking into account serial correlation of food and energy price shocks). Second we determine if typical consumers bias their expectations in a simplistic way, that is they naively use the sectoral shares in consumer expenditure to weight price movements in the food and energy sectors when forming inflation expectations.
To specify our empirical analysis: For the analysis rational weighting portion of the analysis, we augment the theoretical model Van Duyne develops in Food Prices, Expectations, and Inflation so that simultaneous analysis of expectations for price movements in both the food and the energy sector is possible. We create a three sector update to Van Duyne's two sector simple stochastic model of the inflation process, which allows for analysis of the links between food price shocks, expectations, and the overall rate of inflation. Finally, we alter the demand equation and monetary policy rule described in Van Duyne's model. His monetary policy rule, which focuses on how the monetary authority of the modeled economy sets the rate of growth of the nominal money supply, does not capture how contemporary monetary policy is conducted. While, during the late 1960s and the 1970s, it was the practice of many monetary authorities to use the growth rate of the money supply directly as a primary tool of monetary policy, over the past three decades it has been common practice for interest rates to be the main tools of monetary policy. As such, we designed a monetary policy rule that reflects this. Consequently, the demand equation we use is also changed to close our model containing interest rates.
With this new theoretical framework as a basis, we conduct empirical analysis.
We estimate equations for inflation expectations one quarter in the future, reflecting their theoretical analogues, using regression analysis. The regressions, as stated above, analyze the period from the 1980s through the most recent recession. We then use the coe cients we estimate through the regressions to test for bias of sectoral inflation in forming expectations for overall inflation in both the rational weighting context and the naive weighting context.
Rational Weighting Theoretical Model
3.1. Overview. The augmented Van Duyne theoretical model contains three goods: a fixed-price good, called the manufactured good, and two flex-price goods, called the food and the energy goods. We emphasize the structure of the fixed-price sector, while we ignore some significant aspects of flex-price sectors.
3 However, we retain the vital aspect of fixprice-flexprice models: there are quick price adjustments in flex-price markets and sluggish price adjustments in the fixed-price markets. Thus, prices across the di↵ering sectors are determined in fundamentally di↵erent ways. Specifically, food and energy prices are subject to serially correlated supply shocks whereas manufacturing price movements are only dependent on wage inflation. It is this di↵erence in how prices are determined that allows for the conclusion that placing disproportionate relative weight on recent food and energy price behavior may be Muth rational. Our overall theoretical approach will follow Van Duyne's approach.
Elements from Van Duyne Model.
We assume the price of the manufactured good reflects constant markup on production costs. We use cost of labor as a proxy.
3 Explicitly, we do not address the role of commodity stocks in the determination of prices in the flex-price markets, as Van Duyne does in his model.
Thus,
where P m t is the rate of change in the price of the manufactured good and w t is the economy wide rate of wage inflation. Here, prices in the manufacturing sector change at the same rate as nominal wages.
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Now the model must address how wage inflation. With wage agreements renegotiated frequently, nominal wages rise at rate of expected inflation, adjusted for aggregate demand:
[2]w ⇤ determined within the model. Hence, the rate of inflation in the manufacturing sector is also determined.
3.3. Alterations to Van Duyne Model. Let us first address how we determine headline inflation in the model with three sectors. We can write overall rate of inflation in the economy as a weighted average of the inflation observed in the three sectors of the economy:
where 0 < A, B < 1, A + B 6 = 1. P t is the overall rate of inflation in the economy. A, B, and (1 A B) are fixed weights reflecting the shares of energy, food, and manufacturing in consumer expenditures. P x t is the rate of inflation in the energy sector and P f where | |, | | < 1, ⌫ t is a white noise process for the energy sector, and ⌧ t is a white noise process for the food sector. Such shocks could be serially correlated if prices adjust with distributed lags to changes in raw commodity prices. Serial correlation allows for past shocks to help predict current price movements. Since past movements of prices in these sectors predict current inflation, it is rational for economic agents to place more weight on the movement of prices in the food sector when forming expectations about inflation. , we see the unexpected conclusion that rational economic agents will put more weight on past inflation in the food and energy sectors, when forming expectations about current headline inflation.
3.4. Closing the Model. Two equations describing the demand side of the economy are still required. The first summarizes demand and states that the gap between observed unemployment and the natural rate of unemployment is a function of the nominal interest rate minus expectations for inflation one period in the future minus the natural rate of interest. Hence,
where a 3 > 0, i t is the nominal interest rate, and ⇢ is the natural rate of interest, which is similar to the world interest rate.Observe that
where r t is the real interest rate, is the Fisher Equation. Therefore, this demand equation essentially states that the unemployment gap is a function of the real interest rate gap.
The second equation is a monetary policy rule modeled as a version of a Taylor Rule:
where P ⇤ is the monetary authority's target for inflation, This relation can be found through the algebraic interactions of the equations of the theoretical model. Again, economic actors are Muth rational when they know the structure of the economy described in the model, know all endogenous variables realized in period t, waste none of this information, and assume all other actors do the same.
an equation for the unemployment gap including inflation, target inflation, and inflation expectations.
Combining [4] , [9] , and [12] gives
Here, inflation is a function of target inflation, expectations, wage inflation, and temporary disturbances in inflation in the food and energy sectors.
Taking expectations in period t for period t + 1 of equation [13] produces
an equation for inflation expectations. However, this is not the equation that is needed, as it does not yet show expectations as a function of past sectoral inflation rates.
Given the mathematical results
we see that
Rational expectations for inflation one period in the future are a function of a weighted sum of sectoral inflation rates with weights that, generally, di↵er from sectoral expenditure shares. These weights do not sum to one. The serial correlation of the shocks to the food and energy sectors allow for expectations of inflation to be expressed as such a function of past sectoral inflation rates. We now see the intuition for weights on sectoral inflation unequal to expenditure shares borne out algebraically. Expectations one period in the future are also a function of expectations two periods in the future and the monetary authority's target for inflation.
To make this equation clearer, let
In combination with [15] these give
The weights assigned to sectoral inflation in the relation describing inflation expectations are now more easily interpreted.
If it were to be assumed that expectations simply reflect past inflation, calculated using expenditure shares, then
[5] and [6] show that
Although 
from [16] where
The weights ↵ ⇤ and ⇤ are the relative weights that economic agents ought to place on the sectoral rates of inflation in the food and energy sectors in order to form optimum and rational expectations of future inflation. ⇣ can be thought of as the actual inflation elasticity of expectations, which is less than one "because agents do not expect a fully accommodating monetary policy." 5 The direction and magnitude of the bias in weights is dependent on the values of the parameters of the model.
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In conclusion, the relative weights placed on the recent behavior of food and energy prices, in general, are not equal to the expenditure shares for the energy and food sectors.
More specifically, if energy (food) prices and manufacturing prices are determined in fundamentally di↵erent ways, and if these sectoral inflation rates di↵er, then "rational agents should form their expectations by combining sectoral inflation rates using relative weights that generally di↵er from expenditure shares."
Van Duyne, 1982, p. 423 6 The special case in which ↵ ⇤ = A or ⇤ = B occurs when + a2 = 1 or + a2 = 1. Recall that a2 represents the degree of inertia in the wage formation process and that 0 < a2 < 1. A smaller value for the parameter a2 implies more sluggish adjustments of wage inflation to changes in expectations or changes in demand. and represent the degree to which price movements in the energy and food sectors are serially correlated, respectively. Higher values of and indicate that future temporary disturbances in the energy and food sectors are determined more by pervious temporary disturbances in the energy and food sectors. This case is not generally the case, and the case where ↵ ⇤ = A and ⇤ = B requires = .
7 Van Duyne, 1982, p. 424 Thus, it has been illustrated that, in contrast to the simplistic frequency of interaction view of the BEH, it is Muth rational for expectations of inflation to be biased away from the sectoral shares in expenditure, used to calculate actual inflation. The issue of actual bias realized in inflation expectations will next be assessed.
Rational Weighting Empirical Analysis
4.1. Overview. This section addresses the question of whether, when forming expectations of inflation, individuals, in practice, bias the weights they rationally arrive at for inflation in the food and energy sectors away from the sectors respective shares in consumer expenditure. This section outlines the empirical analysis we have done along with the econometric obstacles we encountered. Analysis here specifically addresses whether the professional economists surveyed by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank bias the relative weights assigned to sectoral inflation, for the food and energy sectors, in the formation of their expectations for movements in the CPI.
Our empirical analysis includes estimation of actual weights placed on sectoral inflation through regression analysis and testing for bias in these weights, above or below those weights reflecting expenditure share.
Regression Analysis.
Given the algebraic result of the theoretical model for inflation expectations one period in the future,
we estimate analogous equations to see if expectations are in fact rationally weighted.
Hence, we estimate equations of the form
In [17], E t P t+1 represents expectations of inflation in period t for period t + 1, P ⇤ represents the monetary authority's long term target for inflation (assumed to be 2%), E t P t+2 represents expectations of inflation in period t for period t + 2, P X t represents inflation in the energy sector, P F t represents inflation in the food sector, P O t represents core inflation, and u t is an error term. Here we use core inflation (headline inflation less inflation in the food and energy sectors) in place of inflation in the manufacturing sector because in the theoretical model sectoral inflation in the manufacturing sector should be interpreted as inflation in the economy outside that in the food and energy sectors.
Both inflation in the manufacturing sector in the theoretical model and core inflation in the empirical model are rates of inflation for all consumer expenditures other than food and energy. Also, the target for inflation reflects the implicit target for inflation used by the Federal Reserve System, 2%. All other variables we use in the estimation of equations of form similar to [17] should be interpreted in the same manner as above.
Relating Theory and Empirics. To see the relationship between the theoretical
model and the empirical model, which allows for testing for bias in the weights assigned to sectoral inflation rates, recall the following equations:
[17] is the general equation to be estimated empirically and [16] is the final algebraic result of the theoretical model that allows for easy interpretation of sectoral weights.
Comparison of these equations shows that
The relation between weights in theory and empirics is now clear: the coe cients in the estimated equation can be combined to estimate the optimal weights assigned to the sectoral rates of inflation from the theoretical model. Further, we now see explicitly how ⇣ can be interpreted as an elasticity: ⇣ ⌘ ↵ 3 + ↵ 4 + ↵ 5 represents the e↵ect of a one percentage point increase in actual inflation on expected inflation.
Testing for Bias.
The results of the regression analysis are tested to see whether the relative weights placed on food, energy, and core inflation di↵er from the respective shares in consumer expenditures in a statistically and/or economically significant way. This is testing of the BEH. For such testing, the following null hypotheses are used.
Energy Sector:
Food Sector:
Again, ↵ ⇤ is the relative weight agents place on inflation in the energy sector and ⇤ is the relative weight agents place on inflation in the food sector; A is a fixed weight taking its value from the energy sector's share of consumer expenditure and B is a fixed weight taking its value from the food sector's share of consumer expenditure. Further, equations [18] and [19] allow for the following equations:
These linear combinations of estimated coe cients are what is actually tested statistically. Thus, the empirical methodology for testing the BEH for both the food and energy sectors has been described.
Econometric Issues.
A few econometric issues are necessary to confront in the estimation of these equations. First, coe cients will only be estimated for equations with a one period lag. This mirrors Van Duyne's analysis, as all coe cients he estimated for equations using data with lags of two or more periods were found to be small and insignificant. Second, there is a strong possibility that expectations for inflation two periods in the future, E t P t+2 , (an independent explanatory variable) are correlated with the error term, u t . One could write an equation for E t P t+2 similar to [17] that includes, as an explanatory variable, inflation expectations for three periods in the future, E t P t+3 . This would mean that the coe cients to be estimated would su↵er from omitted variable bias since E t P t+3 is missing from [17] . As such, the technique of instrumental variables is necessary to correct for this potential bias. The instruments that were chosen include the lagged unemployment gap, lagged overall inflation, lagged employment cost index, and lagged average hourly wage. Each of these is likely to be correlated with E t P t+2 but not with u we calculate the average expenditure shares over di↵erent periods of time and test the estimated coe cients for those periods against these. data used is quarterly observations; therefore, one period is equivalent to one quarter.
As stated above, the expectations of inflation used in the regression analysis is quarterly inflation expectations for headline CPI from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank's survey of professional economists. This data is available for one to four quarters in the future. The analysis uses expectations for one and two quarters in the future.
Observed price data is taken in quarterly form from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The headline (overall) Consumer Price Index is used to calculate overall inflation, Core CPI is used to calculate core inflation, CPI Energy is used to calculate inflation in the energy sector, and CPI Food is used to calculate inflation in the food sector.
Coe cients estimated for each time interval are tested against the average of expenditure shares for the appropriate sector, energy or food, during that interval as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. When looking at the entire period, both the most recent expenditure share data, mirroring Van Duynes paper, and overall averages are used.
Finally, the data used for instrumental variables includes be lagged overall CPI, lagged Employment Cost Index, both from the BLS, average hourly wages, and the lagged di↵erence between the Unemployment Rate and the Natural Rate of Unemployment, NROU (an estimate of the natural rate from the Congressional Budget O ce).
The results of this analysis are discussed below.
Naive Weighting Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
The naive weighting view of biased expectations analyzes whether the weights that individuals place on sectoral inflation rates for the food and energy sectors, when forming inflation expectations, are simply taken as the same sectors 0 share in consumer expenditure. If it were to be assumed that expectations simply reflect past inflation, calculated using expenditure shares, then (as described previously)
This very simplistic assumption allows sectoral weights used in the formation of expectations for inflation to be based simply on expenditure shares. This view does not incorporate any economic theory outside general intuition. As such, we empirically model inflation expectations as,
where E t P t+1 is expectations in period t for inflation in period t + 1, P X t is inflation in the energy sector in period t, P F t is inflation in the food sector in period t, P O t is inflation other than in the food and energy sectors in period t, and i and j are less than 1 and are the shares individuals actually assign to sectoral inflation. This equation gives inflation expectations one period in the future as a function of inflation in the energy sector, the food sector, and the rest of the economy. Therefore, estimation of i and j respectively. In this way we determine whether consumers bias their expectations for inflation with respect to the food and energy sectors in the simplistic way. The data used for inflation expectations comes from the University of Michigan's survey of consumers' expectations for inflation one quarter in the future. The data for sectoral inflation and core inflation is the same BLS data for the CPI as above.
We also use the expectations data from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank of economists 0 inflation expectations to check that the economists do not naively weight sectoral inflation rates when forming their expectations.
Results

Rational Weighting Empirical Results.
Here we test whether individuals bias the rational weights given by our theoretical model for sectoral inflation rates as they play into the formation of inflation expectations. As outlined above, we estimate equations of the form [17] by using Instrumental Variables in a Two Stage Least Squares regression context. The elements of the set of regressions we run vary, as mentioned above, by the time interval of the data we use to regress expectations for inflation one period in the future on the explanatory variables and instruments. This allows us to capture changes in the expenditure shares of the food and energy sectors in the CPI while maintaining a large enough number of observations to get meaningful results from regression analysis.
The expenditure share averages we used are listed in Table 1 ; the shares for the food and energy sectors in consumer expenditure vary roughly from 12% to 15% and from 6% to 9%, respectively. The specific time periods were 1983-1989 tested against expenditure share averages for [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] The time periods break the overall period into rough thirds, halves, and a single whole.
We test the coe cients we get from instrumental variables regression analysis against these expenditure share averages according to hypotheses [18] and [19] . The linear combinations we use to approximate ↵ ⇤ and ⇤ , the rational weights implied through our model for inflation in the energy and food sectors, are derived above. The actual equations tested were of the forms [20] and [21] . The p-values resulting from the tests of these hypotheses are included in Table 2 . The test that is run is a one tailed 2 test. The results we present in Table 2 are the probabilities of getting a statistic at least as extreme, in the 2 distribution with the appropriate degrees of freedom, as the one observed from the data. Table 3 for the University of Michigan consumer expectations data and in Table 4 for the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank economist expectations data. The test that is run for both sets of regression results is a F test.
The results we present in Table 3 and Table 4 are the probabilities of getting a statistic at least as extreme, in the F distribution, as the one observed from the data. 1983-2012, 1990-2000, and 1983-1997 1983-2012, 2001-2012, and 1998-2012 Hypothesis, that is held to be true by many policy makers. The BEH states that recent price movements in certain sectors play special or emphasized roles in individuals inflation expectations. We focus on analysis of the BEH within a theoretical framework that produces rational weighting for individuals 0 inflation expectations. Further, this framework allows the possibility for these weights to be biased while being rationally formed.
Because data about consumer expectations for inflation that satisfies the needs of the theoretical framework developed in the previous sections (i.e. expectations data for two periods in the future) is unavailable from the University of Michigan survey of consumers, we use data collected by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank about the multi period inflation expectations of professional economists. We recognize that it is likely that the expectations of professional economists are more Muth rational than those of consumers, as understanding economic theory is their profession. However, it is reasonable to think that consumers are not ignorant of basic economic thinking and that their expectations for inflation would not be drastically di↵erent than those of the economists, when presented with price movements. In particular, the serial correlation of price shocks to the food and energy sectors is fairly intuitive and could be reasonably assumed to factor into consumers 0 formation of inflation expectations. Further, the focus of our empirical analysis is on whether the expectations that economists form are biased, in the way we have outlined. Understanding this and recognizing that typical consumers are, again, not oblivious to economic theory and general macroeconomic intuition, we can understand how it is that consumers do weight their inflations, assuming they are somewhat Muth rational.
We conducted empirical analysis to investigate whether individuals do bias their expectations, given rational formation of expectations. Using data from the period from 1983 to 2012, we looked at whether economists surveyed by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank biased their headline inflation expectations and whether these same economists and consumers naively biased their inflation expectations. Combining pieces of analysis, we may be able to say something about whether consumers bias the weights they assign to sectoral inflation rates in their formation of headline inflation expectations.
The rationally weighted results suggest that when economists form inflation expectations rationally they do not form them with a statistically significant bias with respect to inflation in both the food and the energy sectors. Our theoretical model implies that the weights used to form inflation expectations by the economists surveyed by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank are rational; however, our results indicate that these weights do not di↵er from the sectoral shares in consumer expenditure. Further as conventional wisdom suggests, the results of the naive weighting analysis indicate that economists and typical consumers do not simply use a weighted average of sectoral expenditure shares to form their inflation expectations. 9 This result suggests that both groups do something more sophisticated to form their inflation expectations, though this is di cult to test directly. If it is the case that typical consumers are forming inflation 9 The coe cients on sectoral inflation rates from the naive weighting analysis are typically smaller than the sectoral expenditure shares.
expectations in a manner similar to that described by our model, then we could reasonably conclude that consumers, like the economists we were able to analyze more fully, do not bias their inflation expectations.
This result has important consequences for policy makers. If the BEH is not credible then policy makers should not emphasize recent movements of prices in the food and energy sectors when making policy decisions. Instead, as many policy makers already do, measures of inflation that exclude these highly variable sectoral inflation rates ought to be emphasized.
